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THE OHIO SUPREME COURT’S PERVERSE 
STANCE ON DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
ALAN C. WEINSTEIN* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Ohio is among the twenty-two states that have no enabling legislation for 
development impact fees.  But in a 2000 ruling, Homebuilders Association of Dayton 
and the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, a divided Ohio Supreme Court ruled 
that municipalities could lawfully enact impact fees under their police and “home 
rule” powers, provided that the fees could pass constitutional muster under a “dual 
rational nexus test.”  On May 31, 2012, however, the court ruled in Drees Company 
v. Hamilton Township, that a development impact fee enacted by an Ohio township 
with “limited home rule” powers was an unconstitutional tax.  The court’s 
unanimous opinion in Hamilton Township was authored by Justice Paul Pfeiffer, 
who, twelve years before, had authored the main dissenting opinion in the 
Beavercreek case.  This Article faults the court’s opinion invalidating the impact fees 
in Hamilton Township, arguing that the court, rather than engaging in a fair-handed 
analysis, chose instead to rely on very limited authority to support a conclusion that 
appears to have been pre-determined.  In particular, the Article demonstrates that the 
court failed even to acknowledge, let alone distinguish: (1) its earlier ruling 
upholding impact fees in Beavercreek; and (2) the state supreme court decisions that 
had rejected the reasoning of the Iowa and Mississippi courts upon which the court 
relied in part.  The Article notes that the court’s ruling leaves Ohio with a bifurcated 
approach to impact fees that is perverse because it makes impact fees most 
defensible in municipalities, in many of which there is little new development, and 
thus the need for impact fees is less, and effectively prohibits their use in rapidly-
developing townships where they are needed most.  The Article concludes that the 
time is long-past for the legislature to examine the policy debate on impact fees and 
make a decision about adopting enabling legislation for impact fees, and that the 
decision should be to join the majority of states that have enacted such legislation. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ohio was a pioneer in zoning and land-use regulation,1 but the consensus view 
among scholars is that the state has lagged behind in recent decades.2  Since the 
1950s, many states have comprehensively updated their zoning enabling legislation,3 
enacted environmental impact assessment legislation,4 or recognized the need to 
                                                            
 1 The leading role that Ohio played in the early development of land use regulation in the 
United States can be seen from the fact that Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926), the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court establishing the 
constitutionality of zoning, was an Ohio case.  See generally MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE 
ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER  (Peter C. Huffer & N. E. H. Hull eds., 2008). 
 2 See, e.g., STUART MECK & KENNETH PEARLMAN, OHIO PLANNING & ZONING LAW 62 
(2011), noting that the only major effort to reassess Ohio zoning and planning laws since their 
inception, the Ohio Land Use Review Committee, created by the General Assembly in 1975, 
failed to produce comprehensive legislative changes.  More recently, recommendations for 
comprehensive changes to update the Ohio system of land use regulation, including enabling 
legislation for development impact fees, died in committee.  Report of the Subcomm. on 
Growth & Land Use, 125th Gen. Assembly (2004) (Rep. Larry Wolpert, Chairman Ohio 
House of Representatives, County & Township Government Committee), available at 
http://www.hamiltoncountyohio.gov/hcrpc/fsc/documents/reference/Wolpert%20Report.pd.  
 3 See generally FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND 
USE CONTROL (1972) (describing and analyzing these changes). 
 4 In New York State, for example, most projects or activities proposed by a state agency 
or unit of local government, and all discretionary approvals (permits) from a state agency or 
unit of local government, require an environmental impact assessment as prescribed by N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617 (2012) for the State Environmental Quality Review 
(SEQR).  See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSER. LAW §§ 3-0301(b), 3-0301(2)(m), 8-0113 (McKinney 
2012).  Similarly, California imposed requirements for assessing the environmental impact of 
projects date in 1970 with the enactment of the California Environmental Quality Act 
(codified at CAL. PUB. CONT. § 21000(a), 21000(g) (West 2012)), which requires that state and 
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create effective mechanisms for land-use regulation beyond the boundaries of a 
single jurisdiction.5  Ohio, in contrast, has rejected such efforts6 and the Ohio 
Revised Code retains essentially the zoning laws that were first enacted in 1920.7 
Ohio is also among the twenty-two states that have no enabling legislation for 
development impact fees,8 a mechanism for insuring that new developments pay 
their fair share of the costs for the new infrastructure they will require.9  But in a 
2000 ruling, Homebuilders Association of Dayton and the Miami Valley v. City of 
Beavercreek,10 a divided Ohio Supreme Court approved the use of development 
impact fees by municipalities,11 with the four justice majority12 ruling that 
                                                            
local agencies consider the environmental impact of their decisions when approving a public 
or private project. 
 5 See, e.g., Janice Griffith, Smart Governance for Smart Growth: The Need for Regional 
Governments, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2001); Katherine J. Jackson, The Need for 
Regional Management of Growth, 37 URB. LAW 299 (2005). 
 6 MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 2. 
 7 H.B. 697, 83rd Gen. Assembly (1920); see MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 2, at 61, 
stating, in regards to Ohio’s zoning enabling legislation: “Today their structure remains 
fundamentally unchanged from their original versions.”  
 8 As of January 2012, twenty-eight states had enacted development impact fee 
enablinglegislation. Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-463.05 (cities), 11-1102 (counties) 
(1998); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-103 (West 2003) (cities only); California: CAL. 
GOV’T CODE §§ 66000.5 (mitigation fee act), 66477 (Quimby Act park dedication/fee-in-lieu), 
17620 (school fees) (repealed) (West 1989); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-104.5, 29-
1-801-804 (earmarking requirements), 22-54-102 (school fee prohibition) (2001); Florida: 
FLA. STAT. § 163.31801 (2006); Georgia: GA. CODE. ANN §§ 36-71-1 (1990); Hawaii: HAW. 
REV. StAT. §§ 46-141, 264-121, 320 (schools) (1992); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-8201 
(1992); Illinois: 605 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-901 (West 1987); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. 
§§ 36-7-4-1300-1399 (West 1991); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.30-A, § 4354 (1988); 
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN, Art. 25B, § 13D (West 1992) (code home rule counties only); 
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-1601 (2005); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT., § 278B (1989); 
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:21 (1991); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
27:1C-1, 40:55D-42 (West 1989); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-8-1 (1993) (Conway 
Green); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 223.297 (1991); Pennsylvania: 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
10503-A (1990); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS §45-22.4 (2000); South Carolina:  S.C.  CODE 
ANN. § 6-1-910 (1999); Texas: TEX. LOC. GOV’T ANN. § 395.001 (West 1987); Utah: UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 11-36-101 (West 1995) (repealed 2011); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 
5200 (West 1998); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN., § 15.2-2317 (1990); Washington: WASH. REV. 
CODE § 82.02.050 (1991); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE, § 7-20-1 (1990) (counties); and 
Wisconsin: WIS. STATS. § 66.0617 (1993). 
 9 See generally 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 
6:31 (2nd ed. 2012); JAMES C. NICHOLAS, ARTHUR C. NELSON & JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER, 
A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES (1991). 
 10 Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 
349 (Ohio 2000). 
 11 Local governments in Ohio are classified as either municipal corporations 
(municipalities)—which includes villages (population of less than 5,000) and cities 
(population of 5,000 or more), see OHIO CONST. art. 18, § 1—or unincorporated townships, 
which range in population from a few hundred to more than 60,000.  See OHIO DEP’T OF DEV., 
POLICY RESEARCH & STRATEGIC PLANNING OFFICE, 2010 POPULATION CENSUS COUNT BY 
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municipalities could lawfully enact impact fees under their police and “home rule” 
powers,13 provided that the fees could pass constitutional muster under a “dual 
rational nexus test.”14  On May 31, 2012, however, the court ruled in Drees Company 
v. Hamilton Township,15 that a development impact fee enacted by an Ohio township 
with “limited home rule”16 powers was an unconstitutional tax. The court’s 
unanimous opinion in Hamilton Township was authored by Justice Paul Pfeiffer, 
who, twelve years before, had authored the main dissenting opinion in the 
Beavercreek case. 
This Article faults the court’s opinion invalidating the impact fees in Hamilton 
Township, arguing that the court, rather than engaging in a fair-handed analysis, 
chose instead to rely on very limited authority to support a conclusion that appears to 
have been pre-determined.  In particular, the Article demonstrates that the court 
failed even to acknowledge, let alone distinguish: (1) its earlier ruling upholding 
impact fees in Beavercreek; and (2) the state supreme court decisions that had 
rejected the reasoning of the Iowa and Mississippi courts upon which the court relied 
in part.  The Article notes that the court’s ruling leaves Ohio with a bifurcated 
approach to impact fees that is perverse because it makes impact fees most 
defensible in municipalities, in many of which there is little new development, and 
thus the need for impact fees is less, and effectively prohibits their use in rapidly-
developing townships where they are needed most.  The Article concludes that the 
time is long-past for the legislature to examine the policy debate on impact fees and 
                                                            
COUNTY, CITY, VILLAGE AND TOWNSHIP (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.development.ohio.gov/research/documents/ALLSUB COUNTY2010.pdf. 
 12 Chief Justice Moyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Douglas, Lundberg 
Stratton, and Sweeney, Sr.; Justice Pfeiffer wrote a dissent, with which Justice Resnick 
concurred, and Justice Cook dissented separately. 
 13 OHIO CONST. art. 18, § 3 grants all municipalities the “authority to exercise all powers 
of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, 
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”  Section 4 
grants any municipality the authority to “frame and adopt or amend a charter for its 
government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder 
all powers of local self-government.”  Municipalities that do not adopt a charter still have 
“home rule” authority “to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and 
other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws,” but must follow the 
procedural provisions in the Revised Code as regards the exercise of their powers of local self-
government.  See generally GEORGE D. VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO (1st ed. 
1978); George D. Vaubel, Municipal Home Rule in Ohio: 1976-1995, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
143 (1995). 
 14 See infra text accompanying notes 45-51. 
 15 Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., 970 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 2012). 
 16 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 504 (West 2011) (ORC) governs the establishment of and 
powers granted to townships which adopt a limited home rule form of government. Limited 
home rule enables townships to enact legislation over a broad range of areas in which that 
they could not have legislated as a statutory township having only those powers granted 
expressly by the ORC.  As with home rule municipalities, limited home rule townships may 
not enact legislation specifically prohibited by the ORC or in conflict with the general laws of 
the state.   
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make a decision about adopting enabling legislation for impact fees, and that the 
decision should be to join the majority of states that have enacted such legislation. 
II.  BACKGROUND:  ORIGIN AND EXPANSION OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 
Local governments have long imposed so-called “dedication” requirements as a 
condition for subdivision approvals, requiring that developers dedicate land within 
the subdivision for roads, school, and parks.17  In the case of smaller subdivisions, 
however, land dedication was often problematic because the dedication required in a 
small subdivision was too fragmentary to host a functional school or park and/or was 
not in a suitable location.18  To address this problem, local governments began to 
require that the developer pay a fee in lieu of dedication as a condition for 
subdivision approval of his project, then used those funds to finance schools, parks, 
and other off-site improvements.19 
Development impact fees (hereafter “impact fees”) were a natural outgrowth of 
these fee-in-lieu of dedication requirements.  In the 1970s, local governments began 
to levy impact fees on new development to generate revenue for capital facilities, the 
need for which was created by the new development.  The rationale behind impact 
fees is straight-forward: new development should be required to pay its fair-share of 
the costs of providing public services and facilities to meet the demand for those 
services and facilities created by those who would be living in the new 
development.20  With the decline of federal and state grants to local governments21 
                                                            
 17 See Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages and Regulatory Takings: The Developer’s 
Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 520-21 (1988).  See generally KUSHNER, supra note 9, at § 6. 
 18 Taub, supra note 17 (citing Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding 
Circle of Exactions: From Dedication To Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1987)). 
 19 See NICHOLAS, NELSON & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 9, at 11, which notes:  
Payment in lieu is employed when actual dedication or provision of land or 
improvements is not practical or feasible.  For example, under a requirement to set 
aside 5 percent of a development’s land area as open space, a five-acre subdivision 
would reserve one-quarter of an acre.  Such a site might prove to be totally impractical 
for both the subdivision and the community.  The alternatives were either to exempt 
smaller subdivisions from such requirements or to allow a payment to be made in lieu 
of dedication.  This resulted in local governments requiring money in lieu of land 
dedication.  The money exacted was to equal the value of the land that would have 
been dedicated. 
See also Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Robert Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer To Local 
Government's Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 418 (1981). 
 20 See generally KUSHNER, supra note 9; Connors & High, supra note 18; Juergensmeyer 
& Blake, supra note 19. 
 21 Professor Nelson notes: “From 1955 through 1978, federal aid to local governments and 
states expanded from 0.8% of the gross national product (GNP) to 3.6%. But between 1978 
and 1991, federal aid shrunk to 2.8%.”  Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The 
Next Generation, 26 URB. LAW. 541, 542 n.4 (1994) (citing 2 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 50, Table 24 
(1991)); see also ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 25-26 (1993) (discussing cutbacks in 
federal aid); James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions: Economic Theory, Practice and Incidence, 
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 85-86 (1987) discussing the diminished role of federal and 
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and the anti-tax revolution in the late 1970s,22 the use of impact fees expanded in the 
1980s to include an array of municipal facilities/services, such as fire, police, and 
libraries.23 
The legal status of impact fees was initially at issue, but a series of court cases 
from California,24 Florida,25 and Utah26 validated their usage in the 1970s and 80s 
and, by 1986, three states had enacted impact fee enabling legislation.27  Over the 
next twenty-five years, more than half the states adopted such acts28 and, even in 
states without enabling legislation, impact fees frequently exist in one form or 
another, having been enacted on the basis of local home rule powers or jurisdiction-
specific enabling legislation.29  
III.  THE CURRENT STATUS OF IMPACT FEES IN OHIO 
A.  The Road to Beavercreek 
As noted in the Introduction, while Ohio is among the minority of states that has 
not enacted enabling legislation for impact fees, in Beavercreek,30 the Ohio Supreme 
Court approved the use of impact fees by municipalities, provided certain conditions 
were met.31  Prior to Beavercreek, which approved an impact fee for road 
improvements, the Ohio courts had considered only a handful of “impact fee-like” 
cases, all of which involved fees charged to new development for either utility tap-
                                                            
state governments in financing infrastructure and the resulting shift to user fees as a financing 
mechanism); Taub, supra note 17, at 519 (noting cutbacks in federal aid). 
 22 The 1978 adoption by Initiative of Proposition 13 in California, amending the California 
Constitution to impose strict limits on the rate of increase for real property tax assessments, is 
the prime example of such tax-payer “revolts” against increasing property taxes.  See 
ALTSHULER, note 21, at 23; see also Julie K. Koyoma, Financing Local Government in the 
Post-Proposition 13 Era: The Use and Effectiveness of Nontaxing Revenue Sources, 22 PAC. 
L.J. 1333, 1336-37 (1991). 
 23 Taub, supra note 17, at 520 n.25 (citing John J. Delaney, Larry A. Gordon & Kathryn J. 
Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User 
Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 143 (1987)). 
 24 Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 
606 (Cal. 1971); J.W. Jones Cos. v. San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 25 Contractors & Builders Ass’n of Pinellas Cnty. v. Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976); 
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Home Builders 
& Contractors Ass’n of Palm Beach Cnty. V. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs of Palm Beach Cnty., 
446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
 26 Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979). 
 27 Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling 
Legislation, 25 URB. LAW. 491, 516 (1993) (listing Arizona, California, and New Jersey). 
 28 See state legislation cited supra note 8. 
 29 JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 508 (2d ed. 2007). 
 30 Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 
349 (Ohio 2000). 
 31 See infra text accompanying notes 43-51. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/6
2012] DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES  
 
661 
ins or recreational facilities.  These cases focused on three main issues: (1) whether 
the charges should be considered a fee or a tax; (2) under what authority was the fee 
(or tax) enacted; and (3) the reasonableness of the amount of the fee (or tax). 
In decisions spanning almost three decades that formed the backdrop for the 
Beavercreek decision, Ohio courts ruled that: (1) municipalities had authority under 
Article XVIII, Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution32 to adopt ordinances for water and 
sewer tap-in fees, so long as the fees are “fair and reasonable and bear a substantial 
relationship to the cost involved in providing the service;”33 (2) it is unlawful to 
impose fees that exceed the costs of the services provided;34 (3) taxing new 
development to fund the building, maintenance, and operation of new recreation 
facilities is lawful, provided the revenue derived from the tax is “matched” each year 
by an appropriation from general revenues;35 and (4) courts could re-characterize as a 
tax what a municipality had labeled as an impact fee.36  
                                                            
 32 Article XVIII, Section 4, captioned, “Acquisition of public utility; contract for service; 
condemnation” states:  
Any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate within or without its 
corporate limits, any public utility the product or service of which is or is to be 
supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants, and may contract with others for any 
such product or service.  The acquisition of any such public utility may be by 
condemnation or otherwise, and a municipality may acquire thereby the use of, or full 
title to, the property and franchise of any company or person supplying to the 
municipality or its inhabitants the service or product of any such utility.  
 
OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 4.  This Article was adopted as part of a referendum held on 
September 3, 1912 to consider a number of amendments proposed by the Constitutional 
Convention of 1912.  See generally STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO 
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2004). 
 33 Englewood Hills, Inc. v. Village of Englewood, 237 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1967); see also Amherst Builders Ass’n v. City of Amherst, 402 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1980) 
(upholding sewer connection fees on new users that were segregated into a special fund to pay 
for servicing those users). 
 34 State ex rel. Waterbury Dev. Co. v. Witten, 387 N.E.2d 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977), 
aff’d, 377 N.E.2d 505 (1978) (striking down an “equity value” charge on new connections 
calculated to recoup expenditures previously made to construct the existing water system and 
for the costs of future expansion). 
 35 Towne Props., Inc. v. City of Fairfield, 364 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 1977). In Bldg. Indus. 
Ass’n of Cleveland & Suburban Cntys. v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1995), appeal dismissed as not allowed, 655 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio 1995), reconsideration denied, 
656 N.E.2d 1300 (Ohio 1995), the appeals court invalidated a recreation facility impact fee on 
new development.  The court characterized the “fee” as a tax and ruled it was unlawful 
because the funds generated from taxing new development could be used to maintain and 
operate existing recreation facilities and there was no matching funds requirement as had been 
the case in Towne Properties. 
 36 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Cleveland & Suburban Cntys. v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 
501 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), appeal dismissed as not allowed, 655 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio 1995), 
reconsideration denied, 656 N.E.2d 1300 (Ohio 1995). 
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B.  Beavercreek in the Lower Courts 
The Beavercreek litigation arose from efforts by a fast-growing Dayton suburb to 
deal with “intense development pressure in the northern part of the city due to a 
combination of factors, including the completion of Interstate 675, and the proximity 
of Interstate 70 and major traffic generators like Wright Patterson Air Force Base 
and Wright State University” plus plans for a regional mall in the same general 
area.37  The city manager decided that an impact fee ordinance should be enacted to 
help finance road construction and formed a team of city employees and outside 
consultants to formulate an impact fee ordinance which was enacted in November 
1993.38  The Homebuilders Association and owners of properties affected by the 
ordinance sued.   
The trial court partially granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, ruling 
that the city could lawfully enact an impact fee ordinance based on its police powers 
and home rule authority and that the ordinance was not an invalid tax, but denied 
summary judgment for both sides on equal protection and due process claims.  At 
trial, the court rejected all challenges to the ordinance, including a claim that the 
ordinance was an unconstitutional taking without compensation,39 and entered 
judgment for the city.40 
The District Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, but was then itself 
reversed by the Supreme Court. The critical point on which the District Court and 
the Supreme Court differed was whether the amounts charged under Beavercreek’s 
impact fee ordinance constituted an invalid tax.  The District Court had characterized 
the charges as a tax.  While it acknowledged that “some features weigh in favor of 
the impact charge being considered a fee, the more significant criteria point to the 
fact that the fee is, in reality, a tax.”41  Having found the charges to be a tax, the 
District Court, citing Towne Properties42 and Westlake43 as controlling, ruled the tax 
invalid because the city had not provided for a matching fund. 
                                                            
 37 Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, Nos. 97-
CA-113, 97-CA-115, 1998 WL 735931, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998), rev’d, 729 
N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000). 
 38 Id.  The “team” comprised the City Attorney, City Planning Director, City Engineer, 
City Finance Director, Assistant City Manager, and outside consultants in 
planning/engineering and economic forecasting. The ordinance language itself was based on a 
model impact fee ordinance promulgated by the American Planning Association.  Id. at *2. 
 39 Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 
349 (Ohio 2000). 
 40 City of Beavercreek, 1998 WL 735931, at *3. 
 41 Id. at *6.  The District Court, applying factors for differentiating between a fee and a tax 
developed in State ex rel. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd. v. 
Withrow, 579 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1991), cited the following to support its finding: (1) funds 
collected under the ordinance were placed in the city’s general revenue fund and then used to 
pay for litigation expenses in defending the ordinance; (2) interest earned on the funds 
collected under the ordinance were placed in the city’s general revenue fund; (3) a small group 
is paying the fees while the benefits paid for by the fees are available to the public generally; 
and (4) the primary purpose of the fee was to raise revenue rather than to regulate.  Id. at *6-
11. 
 42 Towne Prop., Inc. v. City of Fairfield, 364 N.E. 2d 289 (Ohio 1977).  
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C.  Beavercreek at the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court majority rejected the District Court’s tax vs. fee dichotomy, 
arguing that “the important factor in determining the constitutionality of an 
ordinance is whether the ordinance is unduly burdensome in application and not its 
label as a tax or an impact fee.”44  The majority then argued that while a matching 
fund provision was a factor that courts might consider to determine the 
constitutionality of an impact fee, the lack of a matching fund was not fatal 
constitutionally.  Rather, “[t]he appropriate test is one that examines whether the fee 
is in proportion to the developer’s share of the city’s costs to construct and maintain 
roadways that will be used by the general public.”45 
“Proportionality” would seem to be a workable test for the legality of an impact 
fee, and, in fact, is part of the Nollan/Dolan “dual rational nexus/proportionality” 
test announced by the U.S. Supreme Court as appropriate to determine the 
constitutionality of development exactions.46  The Beavercreek majority, however, 
engaged in an extensive discussion of what test they should adopt, analyzing how the 
District Court, and the trial court before it, had addressed the plaintiffs’ assertion that 
the impact fee ordinance was an illegal taking of property without just compensation 
                                                            
 43 Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Cleveland & Suburban Cntys. v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 
501 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), appeal dismissed as not allowed, 655 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio 1995), 
reconsideration denied, 656 N.E.2d 1300 (Ohio 1995). 
 44 City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d at 353. 
 45 Id. at 354.  The majority spoke too broadly on this point.  While road construction costs 
may appropriately be included in calculating an impact fee, future road maintenance costs 
would generally be considered inappropriate.  See, e.g., Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing 
Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. 
REV. 177, 205 n.101 (2006), where the author writes:  
It has been uniformly stated by analysts, courts, and legislatures that on-going 
operation and maintenance expenses are not to be paid for by impact fees and that the 
fees are only to provide funding for capital improvement costs necessitated by 
development.  This view apparently stems from the view that the funding of operation 
and maintenance should come from generally-derived tax revenues as a general 
operating cost of government.  Implicit in this outlook is the idea that such a general 
community expense should not be charged to a limited segment of the locality’s 
population through a focused impact fee on new development. 
(citing JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 328-32 (2003)). 
 46 In Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the Court ruled that an 
exaction required as a condition for development approval could only be justified 
constitutionally if there was an “essential nexus” between the condition imposed and the 
governmental interest claimed as the justification for the condition.  Because the government 
could not meet this test in Nollan, the Court did not reach the question of how exact a 
measurement of the “essential nexus” was required to pass constitutional muster.  That 
question was answered in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), with the Court ruling 
that the appropriate test was “rough proportionality.”  See generally BRIAN W. BLAESSER & 
ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION 263-70 (2011). 
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in violation of both the United States and Ohio constitutions.47 The majority 
ultimately agreed with the trial court that the Nollan/Dolan standard was the most 
appropriate.48 
The majority’s standard required first that the city “demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable relationship between the city’s interests in constructing new roadways 
and the increase in traffic generated by new development.”49  If that reasonable 
relationship is demonstrated, the city must then demonstrate “that there is a 
reasonable relationship between the impact fee imposed by Beavercreek and the 
benefits accruing to the developer from the construction of new roadways.”50 The 
majority noted that this portion of the test “addresses whether the developer and the 
city are paying their proportionate shares of the costs necessary to construct new 
roadways.”51  The majority then explained that while a matching fund provision was 
one way to measure whether a city’s contribution met its obligation to pay a 
proportionate share of project costs, it was not the only permissible way the city 
could meet its proportionate share obligation, noting various “credits” that the city 
would apply towards a developer’s obligation under the ordinance.52  Applying the 
                                                            
 47 City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d at 354-56.  The trial court had applied the 
Nollan/Dolan test in upholding the impact fee. The District Court, after an exhaustive analysis 
of the appropriate standard, ultimately concluded that  
although the words used to describe the various tests may be different, the tests all 
actually focus in legal terms, and in application, on the existence of a connection 
between the dedication or fee and the needs generated by the development.  Whether 
one wants to call this “reasonable relationship,” “rational nexus,” “rough 
proportionality,” or “specifically and uniquely attributable,” the important issue is 
whether the dedication or fee is reasonably connected to the needs created by the 
development. 
Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, Nos. 97-CA-113, 
97-CA-115, 1998 WL 735931, at *18 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998), rev’d, 729 N.E.2d 349 
(Ohio 2000). 
 48 City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d at 353.  The majority, however, failed to address the 
concern that had been raised by some courts about extending the Nollan/Dolan approach to 
uniform legislatively enacted impact fees.  See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 
429 (Cal. 1996).  Further, while acknowledging that the “dual rational nexus/rough 
proportionality test” arose in the context of land-use exactions that required landowners 
seeking a permit to dedicate land to public use, the majority did not acknowledge that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had suggested that Dolan’s rough proportionality test should not be extended 
beyond “the special context of exactions—land-use decisions conditioning approval of 
development on the dedication of property to public use.”  City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999); see also JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 29, 
at 527-34; Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal – Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative 
Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487 (2006).  See generally Charles Thompson Switzer, Note, Escaping 
the Takings Maze: Impact Fees and the Limits of the Takings Clause, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1315, 
1328-40 (2009) (discussing four approaches to the issue of applying Nollan/Dolan to impact 
fees and concluding they should not be applied). 
 49 City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d at 356. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 357. 
 52 Id. at 357-58. 
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standard it had just announced, the majority concluded that the city had met its 
burden.  
Three of the seven justices dissented.  Justice Pfeiffer, joined by Justice Resnick, 
rejected the majority’s argument that “classification as an impact fee or a tax is not 
determinative” and would have struck down the impact fee ordinance as an 
unconstitutional tax.53  In the alternative, he argued that if a particular impact fee 
ordinance was not found to be an invalid tax, then he would favor judging the 
constitutionality of the fee under the “specifically and uniquely attributable to the 
needs of the development” standard, a “stricter test than that put forth by the 
majority.”54  Finally, he claimed that the impact fee at issue did not meet the second 
part of the majority’s dual rational nexus test because the city was not obligated to 
provide any of the credits potentially available.55  Justice Cook dissented separately, 
stating that he would have affirmed the District Court’s decision based on that 
court’s reasoning that the impact fee was actually an invalid tax because the 
ordinance did not contain a mandatory matching funds provision.56 
D.  Limits of the Beavercreek Ruling 
Given the lack of state impact fee enabling legislation in Ohio, the Beavercreek 
ruling at least clarified that municipalities could enact impact fees based on their 
police and home rule powers57 and provided a workable standard for judging such 
fees.58  But Beavercreek provided far less guidance than would well-drafted state 
impact fee enabling legislation.  Stuart Meck and Ken Pearlman provide an 
extensive, but not exhaustive, list of questions that remained after Beavercreek, 
which state legislation could address: 
[T]here are still many policy issues that state legislation could resolve.  
For example, what happens to impact fees from an individual 
development that a municipality has not expended within a certain period 
of time (say, five years), something the appeals court noted the 
Beavercreek ordinance failed to provide for?  If they are to be rebated, 
should that be with interest?  What level of service may a local unit of 
government impose and what kind of studies should be necessary to 
impose it?  Should all governmental facilities that create an impact on 
traffic be exempted from payment of impact fees, as the Beavercreek 
ordinance provided for? Is there any obligation to first correct existing 
                                                            
 53 Id. at 358-59. 
 54 Id. at 359; Justice Pfeiffer failed, however, to acknowledge that the majority’s dual 
rational nexus standard was the view espoused by most state courts.  See JUERGENSMEYER & 
ROBERTS, supra note 29, at 420. 
 55 City of Beavercreek, 729 NE.2d at 359. 
 56 Id. 
 57 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 29, at 519.  Note that, in the absence of 
enabling legislation, a major attack on the legality of impact fees has been the claim that “they 
were not authorized by state statute or constitutional provision and therefore were void as 
ultra vires acts of the governmental entities which had enacted them.”  Id. 
 58 See id. at 523-27  (discussion of various standards); City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d at 
354-56. 
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conditions that do not satisfy adopted level of service standards before 
addressing future conditions?  What kind of requirements should be 
placed on municipalities to plan future land use on which the full build-
out of the impact fee district may be calculated and to prepare, adopt, and 
execute capital improvement programs?  Until the Ohio General 
Assembly acts, these questions and many, many others will be litigated, 
no doubt expensively, on a case-by-case basis.59 
The above list is far from exhaustive.  There are many other questions that 
Beavercreek failed to address, several of which are quite fundamental.  A basic 
question that state enabling legislation could address is the type of infrastructure, 
facilities, or services that can be funded through impact fees.  Beavercreek involved 
road improvements, and the majority opinion makes no mention of other types of 
facilities, but impact fees have been used to fund far more than roads.  
Authorizations for infrastructure improvements among the twenty-eight states that 
currently have enabling acts include: water (twenty-four states), sewer (twenty-four 
states), storm water (twenty-three states), and parks (twenty-three states).60  
Authorizations for services and facilities include: fire (twenty-two states), police 
(twenty states), library (thirteen states), solid waste (eleven states), and schools 
(twelve states).61  
Julian Juergensmeyer and Tom Roberts list several other important questions that 
enabling legislation could address:62 (1) the credits issue, dealing with the extent to 
which a developer’s proportionate share of project costs should be reduced to reflect 
such items as the developer’s previous or future monetary or in-kind contributions 
(e.g., land dedication or construction of infrastructure) and monetary payments for 
the infrastructure or services at issue provided by the enacting jurisdiction and/or 
other levels of government;63 (2) the capital versus non-capital expenditures 
problem, dealing with whether monies collected through an impact fee system may 
ever be used for the maintenance of infrastructure;64 (3) exemptions from the fee 
requirements for certain types of development, dealing with the issue of whether the 
potential exclusionary effect of an impact fee should be mitigated by exempting low 
and moderate income housing, or other developments deemed to be socially 
                                                            
 59 MECK & PEARLMAN, supra note 2, at 668. 
 60 CLANCY MULLEN, DUNCAN ASSOCS., NATIONAL IMPACT FEE SURVEY: 2011 3 (Nov. 20, 
2011), available at http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/2011_survey.pdf.  
Duncan Associates is a nationally-known consulting firm that specializes in plan 
implementation services, including impact fee studies and ordinances, for local and state 
governments. Prior surveys prepared by Duncan Associates have been used in other 
publications.  See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 29, at 534-35. 
 61 Mullen, supra note 60. 
 62 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 29, at 536-40. 
 63 Id. at 536; see also Charles C. Mulcahy & Michelle J. Zimet, Impact Fees for a 
Developing Wisconsin, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 759, 789-90 (1996) (describing credits provision in 
Wisconsin enabling legislation). 
 64 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 29, at 536. 
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desirable, from the obligation to pay the impact fees either in full or in part;65 and (4) 
what land uses can be charged what impact fees, dealing with the issue, for example, 
of whether non-residential development may lawfully be charged fees for facilities—
such as parks, libraries, and schools—the demand for which is only tenuously 
connected to non-residential development.66  
There are also numerous “design” issues that can be addressed through an 
enabling statute.  To list just a few: (1) will there be a requirement that the 
imposition of an impact fee be based on a capital facilities plan and/or future land-
use plan?;67 (2) when should an impact fee be assessed (or the amount calculated) 
and when should it be collected?;68 (3) how frequently must an impact fee be re-
calculated?;69 and (4) what percentage, if any, of the impact fees may be spent on 
administration of the impact fee system?70 
Critically, the Beavercreek ruling was also lacking in comparison to state 
enabling legislation in terms of its reach: because the court’s ruling addressed impact 
fees only in the context of municipal home rule authority, it provided no guidance on 
the issue of whether Ohio townships could lawfully enact impact fees. This was not, 
per se, a failure of the court, of course. The issue of township impact fees was not 
before the court and the majority could easily have been criticized had they 
discussed that issue sua sponte.  But the issue called out to be addressed. 
The majority of vacant land undergoing development lay in townships, not 
municipalities;71 thus, townships were facing the greatest demand for new 
                                                            
 65 Id. at 537-38; see also S. Mark White, Development Fees and Exemptions for 
Affordable Housing: Tailoring Regulations to Achieve Multiple Public Objectives, 6 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 25 (1990). 
 66 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 29, at 538-40; see also Volusia Cnty. v. 
Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000) (exempting age-restricted 
mobile home park that did not permit children as residents from payment of impact fee for 
schools). 
 67 These would be formal documents developed separately from whatever planning was 
required to justify the imposition of the impact fee.  For example, the former Utah impact fee 
enabling statute, UTAH CODE. ANN. § 11-36-201 (West 2012) (repealed 2011), required a 
capital facilities plan as a condition for enacting an impact fee. 
 68 Developers normally favor having impact fees calculated as soon as possible in the 
permit approval process, so they know what the amounts will be early-on and can build that 
into their financial projections, with collection of the fees postponed to the latest possible date 
in the permit approval process so as to minimize the developer’s carrying costs.  Government 
normally favors calculation as late as possible, to avoid the need for recalculation or possible 
refunds if the project size changes, and collection as soon as possible, again for obvious 
reasons.   
 69 Every two years?  Every five?  Ten? 
 70 The use of impact fee revenue to pay for defending the lawsuit against the City of 
Beavercreek had been one of the factors cited by the District Court in declaring that the 
impact fee was actually a tax.  Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of 
Beavercreek, Nos. 97-CA-113, 97-CA-115, 1998 WL 735931, at *6-9 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 
1998), rev’d, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000). 
 71 Data from the “2010 Population Census Count by County, City, Village and Township,” 
OHIO DEP’T OF DEV., supra note 11, illustrates this point.  For example, in Geauga County and 
Medina County, largely rural counties neighboring Cleveland and its Cuyahoga County 
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infrastructure to serve the new development.  Further, since 1991, Ohio townships 
had been able to adopt a “limited home rule” form of government and so it was 
certainly conceivable that the Beavercreek ruling that impact fees could be enacted 
based on municipal “home rule” authority might, in an appropriate case, be extended 
to a township that had adopted the “limited home rule” form of government.  It 
would, however, be a dozen years before the issue came before the court. 
E.  The Hamilton Township Case 
On May 31, 2012, the court ruled in Drees Company v. Hamilton Township,72 
that a development impact fee enacted by an Ohio township with “limited home 
rule”73 powers was an unconstitutional tax.  The unanimous opinion was authored by 
Justice Paul Pfeiffer, who, twelve years before, had authored one of the two 
dissenting opinions in Beavercreek.74  
Hamilton Township is approximately twenty-five miles from downtown 
Cincinnati, ten miles from I-275, the Interstate that encircles greater Cincinnati,75 
and five miles from I-71, which links Cincinnati to Ohio’s two other major cities: 
Columbus and Cleveland.  These locational advantages, combined with ample land 
available for development plus good schools and services, have made the Township 
a very desirable place to live:76  the population has quadrupled over the past two 
decades.77  
                                                            
suburbs, population growth in townships has far exceeded the population growth in 
municipalities for the past two decades.  In Geauga County, where the overall population 
growth for 1990-2010 was 12,260, 84% of that increase occurred in townships.  In Medina 
County, where the overall population growth for 1990-2010 was 49,984, 60% of that increase 
occurred in townships.  Similar growth patterns occurred elsewhere in Ohio.  For example, in 
Delaware County, neighboring Columbus and its Franklin County suburbs, townships 
accounted for 61.2% of the population growth from 1990-2010. 
 72 Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., 970 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 2012). 
 73 Ohio Revised Code Chapter 504 governs the establishment of and powers granted to 
townships which adopt a limited home rule form of government.  OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 
504 (West 2012).  Limited home rule enables townships to enact legislation over a broad 
range of areas in which that they could not have legislated as a statutory township having only 
those powers granted expressly by the ORC.  As with home rule municipalities, limited home 
rule townships may not enact legislation specifically prohibited by the ORC or in conflict with 
the general laws of the state. 
 74 Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, the only other remaining member of the Beavercreek court, 
had joined the four-justice majority in that case. 
 75 Cincinnati borders the Ohio River and thus portions of I-275 are in both Ohio and 
Kentucky. 
 76 The Township website notes: “Cincy Magazine’s article ‘Rating the Burbs’ ranks 
Hamilton Township 9th out of 43 communities in the tri-state and overall 7th in community 
safety (2009).”  HAMILTON TWP., http://hamilton-township.org/ (last visited July 26, 2011).  
 77 In 1990, the Township had 5,854 residents.  By 2010, the population had ballooned to 
23,556. OHIO DEP’T OF DEV., supra note 11.  The most recent population estimate of 23,809 
shows continued growth in the township despite the lack of new residential development due 
to overall real estate market conditions.  OHIO DEP’T OF DEV., POLICY RESEARCH & STRATEGIC 
PLANNING OFFICE, 2011 POPULATION ESTIMATES BY COUNTY, CITY, VILLAGE AND TOWNSHIP 
(July 2012), available at http://development.ohio.gov/research/ documents/P5027.pdf. 
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Such rapid growth, creating significant demand for both infrastructure and 
government services, is exactly the circumstance that leads local governments to 
enact an impact fee ordinance, which is what Hamilton Township did on May 2, 
2007.78  The “ordinance”—Ohio Township legislation is termed a Resolution and I 
will use that term hereafter—was fairly sophisticated by any standard.  It included 
four fee categories: (1) a road impact fee; (2) a fire protection impact fee; (3) a 
police protection impact fee; and (4) a park impact fee.  The amount of each fee 
would be calculated for several different types of land-uses (e.g., single-family, 
multi-family, retail/commercial, industrial, etc.) based on the demand for 
infrastructure/services that had been calculated for each land-use.79  
The fees were to be kept in separate accounts segregated from the Township’s 
general fund.  If the fees were not spent on projects initiated within three years of 
their collection date, they would be returned, with interest, to the party that paid the 
fee.80  The resolution also exempted certain types of development from payment81 
and created a system of credits towards the road impact fee for certain roadway 
improvements.82  Finally, the fees would be phased-in over a two-year period, 
starting at 33% of their full amount ninety days after the effective date of the 
resolution, increasing to 66% of their full amount one year after that, and reaching 
100% after a second year.83 
                                                            
 78 Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., No. CA2009-11-150, 2010 WL 2891746, at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 26, 2010). 
 79 Thus, for example, single-family and multi-family dwellings paid a park impact fee, but 
non-residential land uses did not.  Id.  Similarly, a retail/commercial land use paid fire and 
police impact fees totaling $697 per 1,000 sq. ft., while a warehouse land use paid only $157 
per 1,000 square feet. Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 The Resolution exempted the following from payment of fees: (1) Alterations of an 
existing dwelling unit where no additional dwelling units are created.  (2) Replacement of a 
destroyed, partially destroyed or moved residential building or structure with a new building 
or structure of the same use and with the same number of dwelling units as the original 
building or structure.  This exemption shall not apply in the case of a destroyed, partially 
destroyed or moved structure which contains an illegal nonconforming use under the zoning 
regulations of Hamilton Township, Ohio.  (3) Replacement of a destroyed, partially destroyed 
or moved nonresidential building or structure with a new building or structure of the same use 
and not exceeding the gross floor area of the original building or structure.  (4) Any 
development for which a completed application for a zoning certificate was submitted prior to 
the effective date of this resolution, provided that the construction proceeds according to the 
provisions of the building permit for which the zoning certificate was issued and the permit 
does not expire prior to the completion of the construction.  In the event that the zoning 
certificate does expire before completion of construction, then the provisions of this impact 
fee shall apply to the development.  In such case, the zoning certificate shall not be issued 
without the payment of the impact fee.  HAMILTON TOWNSHIP IMPACT FEE ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULES 7-8 (2007), available at http://zoning.hamilton-township.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/impactFees_11-2008.pdf. 
 82 Id. at 8-13. 
 83 Id. at 3.  Gradually phasing-in the fees provides developers subject to the fees time to 
account for the fees in their financial calculations.  See generally ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-
IBANEZ, supra note 21, at 97-111 (discussing at length the factors that determine which party 
or parties in the land development and sales process will bear the cost of the impact fee). 
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In the fall of 2007, several developers subject to the fees brought suit. The trial 
court granted summary judgment to the Township.84 On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Twelfth District upheld the trial court in a unanimous decision, with 
Judge Powell focusing on the question of whether the impact fees at issue were a tax 
versus a fee and ruling that they were a fee rather than a prohibited form of 
taxation.85  Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Pfeiffer reversed the 
Twelfth District in an opinion that is perplexing, if not distressing, for its failure to 
explain why the court here engaged in an analysis of the “tax vs. fee” issue that 
differed so greatly from that in Beavercreek.  
In the first portion of his opinion, Justice Pfeiffer analyzed the challenged impact 
fee based on standards announced in two cases that came from regulatory contexts 
far removed from the regulation of land development.  State ex rel. Petroleum 
Underground Storage Tank Release Compensation Board, v. Withrow,86 a 1991 Ohio 
Supreme Court case, involved a state statute that imposed fees on the owners and 
operators of underground storage tanks to create a fund that would be used to 
address the costs associated with spills and leaks.  American Landfill, Inc. v. 
Stark/Tuscarawas/Wayne Joint Solid Waste Management District,87 a 1999 ruling 
from the federal Sixth Circuit, examined whether assessments imposed by solid-
waste management districts on persons disposing of materials at their facilities were 
fees or taxes for purposes of the federal Tax Injunction Act.88  
Justice Pfeiffer first applied what he termed the “Withrow Factors”89 and argued 
that the impact fee “differs in several important respects from the assessment this 
court deemed a fee in Withrow.”90  Justice Pfeiffer found that the impact fee: (1) 
“lacks the regulatory aspect of the fee charged in Withrow,” arguing that it was “a 
revenue generator with the stated purpose of guaranteeing a consistent level of 
services to all members of the community” that does not “protect the public from 
                                                            
 84 Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., No. CA2009-11-150, 2010 WL 2891746, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 26, 2010). 
 85 Id. at *4.  Judge Powell also ruled that the Resolution did not conflict with the general 
laws of the state and did not alter the structure of township government.  Id.  Because the trial 
court had decided the case below on summary judgment regarding whether the impact fees 
were or were not a tax, there was no consideration at trial of whether the impact fees met the 
Nollan/Dolan dual rational nexus test or some other test. 
 86 State ex rel. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd. v. Withrow, 579 
N.E.2d 705 (Ohio 1991).   
 87 Am. Landfill, Inc. v. Stark/Tuscarawas/Wayne Joint Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 166 F.3d 
835 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 88 “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or 
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had 
in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).   
 89 The “Withrow Factors,” in Justice Pfeiffer’s view, were: (1) is the fee “imposed in 
furtherance of regulatory measures”; (2) is the fee “never placed in the general fund” and used 
only for “narrow and specific” regulatory purposes; (3) is the fee imposed by government in 
exchange for a service it provides; and (4) what happens when the fees collected exceed—or 
fall short of—a certain amount? Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., 970 N.E.2d 916, 919-22 (Ohio 
2012).   
 90 Id. at  920. 
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specific threats,”91 (2) “the revenue generated by the assessment in this case is spent 
on typical township expenses inuring to the benefit of the entire community,”92 (3) 
“assessed parties get no particular service above that provided to any other taxpayer 
for the fee that they pay,”93 and (4) the fee is not “tied to events” but to “the spending 
whims of government.”94  Characterizing the analysis in American Landfill as 
“similar to that used in Withrow,”95 Justice Pfeiffer applied that analysis to the 
Township’s impact fee and reached the same conclusion:  the impact fee was 
actually a tax.96  
While Justice Pfeiffer found that these cases supported his conclusion that the 
impact fee was actually an unauthorized tax, he acknowledged that neither case had 
“involved the type of assessment at issue in this case”97 and proceeded to discuss 
“other state supreme courts facing very similar matters [that] have found that impact 
fees constituted taxes,” noting that a “key factor in those cases was the extent of the 
public benefit that resulted from the assessment.”98  That discussion included two 
state supreme court cases—a 2002 Iowa case involving a park impact fee99 and a 
2006 Mississippi case that involved various impact fees100—plus a 1998 federal Fifth 
Circuit case.101  Justice Pfeiffer argued that these cases buttressed his conclusion that 
the impact fee at issue was an invalid tax:  each found that the benefits that were paid 
for by the impact fee(s) accrued to the community at large rather than only to those 
who had paid the fee(s), and, in his view, this was also the case for the Hamilton 
Township impact fees.102 
F.  Was Hamilton Township Correctly Decided? 
Justice Pfeiffer’s opinion is defensible when viewed on its own terms; that is, if 
one accepts the premises of the opinion that the impact fee at issue may 
appropriately be analyzed under Withrow and American Landfill, and further, that 
                                                            
 91 Id. at  920. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 921. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 922. 
 97 Id. at 923. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Iowa Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines, 644 
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 2002).  
 100 Mayor of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass’n of Miss., Inc., 932 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 
2006).  The city had six separate impact fees: (1) general municipal facilities; (2) fire 
facilities; (3) park and recreation facilities; (4) police facilities; (5) major roadways; and (6) 
water facilities. Id. at 48.   
 101 Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(examining whether impact fee was a fee or tax for purposes of the federal Tax Injunction 
Act); see supra note 88. 
 102 Drees, 970 N.E.2d at 920-21. 
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“other state supreme courts facing very similar matters have found that impact fees 
constituted taxes.”  But what happens when one subjects each of these premises to 
closer scrutiny? 
As Justice Pfeiffer himself acknowledged, Withrow and American Landfill dealt 
with regulatory settings that were quite different from that in the Hamilton Township 
case.  In that case, as in Beavercreek before it, the setting was the land use regulatory 
process and, in particular, the issue of what method should be used to fund the 
provision of infrastructure and the capital costs of services that are necessitated by 
residential growth and the non-residential development that accompanies it.  This 
issue has been before the courts for more than eighty years.  
In the 1930s, courts dealt with challenges to land dedication requirements within 
a subdivision as a condition of development approval.  Succeeding decades saw new 
challenges each time conditions placed on development approval evolved:  from 
dedication requirements inside a subdivision to outside a subdivision; from 
dedication requirements to fee-in-lieu of dedication requirements; and most recently, 
from fee-in lieu of requirements to assessment of impact fees.103  Because fee-in-lieu 
requirements and impact fees each involve developers’ making cash payments, one 
of the most common challenges to these methods has been the claim that the fee in 
question was really a tax.104    
Numerous courts have grappled with that question, with little consistency in their 
decisions.105 Scholars have noted the problem106 and been critical of the results.107 
They have concluded that impact fees have aspects of both fees and taxes and cannot 
be characterized definitively as either.108  This scholarly critique of the fee versus tax 
                                                            
 103 See Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 191-204.  Professor Rosenberg subtitles his discussion 
of the evolution of infrastructure funding as “An American Tradition” and argues that the 
twentieth century saw “a steady growth in the use of land development exactions to impose 
specific costs on land developers.”  Further, “This trend has accelerated in the last two 
decades and has resulted in the widespread use of subdivision land improvement and 
dedication requirements, impact fees, and linkage programs all having the effect of shifting 
development-related expenses from the community to the land developer.”  Id. at 192. 
 104 Id. at 218-20, 249-52 (discussing, respectively, such challenges in the periods before 
and after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dolan ruling); see also Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical 
Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1833, 1866-75 (2010) (discussing various challenges).  
 105 See Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 250 (noting that “the decisions did not indicate any 
clear pattern in results, with half of the impact fees being classified as regulatory devices 
while the other half were characterized as ‘taxes’”). 
 106 Id.  Rosenberg also notes that “making the regulatory fee/tax determination is a difficult 
task, and courts have not used a uniform framework for making this important decision.”  Id. 
 107 “Discerning the differences between invalid taxes and permissible regulatory fees has 
been difficult for courts to do with any defining principle or consistency.  It has been even 
harder for them to articulate a coherent rationale for the distinctions they have drawn.”  Id. at 
219; see also TAKING SIDES ON TAKING ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 366 
(Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002) (noting that challenges to two identical school impact fees 
yielded opposite results, with the fee in St. Johns County, Florida upheld as proper regulatory 
fee and the same fee in Franklin, Massachusetts struck down as an unauthorized tax).   
 108 See, e.g., Kent, supra note 104, at 1875 (discussing the issue at length and concluding 
that “impact fees cannot definitively be labeled as either ‘fees’ or ‘taxes’”).  This same point 
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issue calls Justice Pfeiffer’s opinion into question on two counts.  First, of course, it 
questions the Justice’s effort to characterize the Township’s impact fee in those 
terms in the first place.  Second, it questions the Justice’s failure to distinguish the 
many cases where state courts found that impact fees imposed in the absence of state 
enabling legislation  did not constitute taxes.109  
My harshest criticism of the Hamilton Township Court, is not limited to Justice 
Pfeiffer’s opinion, however.  One is hard-pressed to state a principled reason why 
none of the justices saw fit to acknowledge that this very court, “facing very similar 
matters” only twelve years before in Beavercreek, had rejected Hamilton Township’s 
tax vs. fee dichotomy, arguing instead that “the important factor in determining the 
constitutionality of an ordinance is whether the ordinance is unduly burdensome in 
application and not its label as a tax or an impact fee.”110  We are, regrettably, left 
with the distressing conclusion that the court’s failure to explain why in Hamilton 
Township it revived the tax vs. fee analysis rejected in Beavercreek, is most likely 
outcome driven.  
Recall that in Beavercreek, Justice Pfeiffer’s dissent had rejected the majority’s 
argument that “classification as an impact fee or a tax is not determinative” and 
would have struck down the impact fee ordinance as an unconstitutional tax.111  He 
argued further that if a particular impact fee ordinance was not found to be an invalid 
tax, then he would favor judging the constitutionality of the fee under the 
“specifically and uniquely attributable to the needs of the development” standard, a 
“stricter test than that put forth by the majority.”112 
Avoiding any mention of Beavercreek meant that Justice Pfeiffer did not have to 
overcome what he possibly thought was the substantial hurdle of convincing a 
majority of the court why that case should not have precedential authority for 
Hamilton Township.  There is, however, a somewhat plausible argument for 
                                                            
was made in an article critiquing Mayor of Ocean Springs v. Homebuilders Ass’n of 
Mississippi, Inc., 932 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 2006), one of the cases Justice Pfeiffer discusses in 
support of his finding that the Township impact fee was an invalid tax.  See Kenneth D. 
Farmer, Impact Fees: An Alternative Way to Finance Public Facilities in Mississippi, 28 
MISS. C. L. REV. 287, 293-94 (2009) (noting that impact fees share characteristics with both 
taxes and regulatory fees  and that “courts have not developed a uniform framework for 
making the regulatory tax/fee determination”). 
 109 See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836 (Kan. 1995) (rejecting claim that 
transportation impact fee was an illegal tax); Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 
606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that park fee was regulatory and not an illegal tax); 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (rejecting claim that a development fee 
was an illegal tax because it was revenue-raising).  See generally Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 
249-52 (discussing at length the different approaches used and outcomes reached by various 
courts that have addressed whether an impact fee should be classified as a tax or a fee and 
finding that “the decisions did not indicate any clear pattern in results, with half of the impact 
fees being classified as regulatory devices while the other half were characterized as ‘taxes’”).  
 110 Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 
N.E.2d 349, 353 (Ohio 2000). 
 111 Id. at 358-59. 
 112 Id. at 359. Justice Pfeiffer also claimed that the impact fee at issue did not meet the 
second part of the majority’s dual rational nexus test because the city was not obligated to 
provide any of the credits potentially available. Id. 
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distinguishing Beavercreek, by focusing on a basic difference in the extent of land 
use regulatory powers in municipalities as compared with townships.  
Beavercreek dealt with an impact fee enacted by a municipality.  Like all Ohio 
municipalities, the City of Beavercreek exercised full regulatory control over the 
development of land:  state enabling legislation authorizes it to enact and administer 
both zoning and subdivision regulations.113  In contrast, Hamilton Township, like all 
Ohio townships, did not exercise full regulatory control over the development of 
land:  state enabling legislation authorizes it to enact and administer only zoning 
regulations.114 The enactment and administration of subdivision regulation is left to 
counties.115  The fact that Hamilton Township has adopted the limited home rule 
form of government makes no difference in this regard:  Ohio Revised Code Section 
504, while granting many home rule powers, explicitly excludes subdivision 
regularity authority from the powers that may be exercised by a limited home rule 
township.116   
Impact fees evolved from fee-in-lieu of land dedication requirements in the 
subdivision regulatory process117 and are still primarily imposed in that process as a 
condition for subdivision plat approval.118 An Ohio township, although able to 
exercise some home rule powers, lacks subdivision regulatory authority and thus can 
only impose an impact fee as a condition for zoning approval, not subdivision plat 
approval.  Given the derivation of impact fees from, and their exercise largely 
within, the subdivision regulatory process, the lack of such authority could have 
provided a plausible, if fairly formalistic, argument in favor of a finding that the 
court’s Beavercreek ruling was not controlling in Hamilton Township.  Needless to 
say, it would also have evidenced a more appropriate degree of respect for precedent.        
Even had the above argument been made in Hamilton Township, the opinion 
remains distressing for its failure to acknowledge that the decisions from other states 
are split on the tax vs. fee characterization debate.119  To discuss only three rulings, 
                                                            
 113 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 711, 713 (West 2012). 
 114 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 519 (West 2012). 
 115 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.10 (West 2012). 
 116 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 504.04(B)(3) (West 2012) denies a limited home rule township 
authority to “establish or revise subdivision regulations.” 
 117 See discussion supra notes 17-23. 
 118 The operation of the Beavercreek impact fee ordinance is typical. As described by the 
Second District:  
Under the ordinance, fees for single family developments had to be paid before the 
City's release and approval of the plat for the development, unless the platting was 
done in more than one section.  In such an event, the fee applicable to a particular 
section needed to be paid before approval and release of the plat for the section.  For 
all other land development activity, the fee payment was due before the City issued a 
zoning permit or a certificate of zoning compliance for the development.  
Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, Nos. 97-CA-113, 
97-CA-115, 1998 WL 735931, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1998), rev’d, 729 N.E.2d 349 
(Ohio 2000). 
 119 See discussion supra notes 104-108. 
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all of which favor one side of that debate, is more akin to advocacy than judging; 
and poor advocacy at that.120     
IV.  WHERE ARE WE AND WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IT? 
A.  Where are We? 
As a result of Hamilton Township, Ohio now has different tests for judging the 
legality of a development impact fee depending on whether the challenged fee was 
enacted by a municipality or a township.  If the fee was enacted by a municipality, 
the court will apply Beavercreek’s dual rational nexus test.  Any well-drafted impact 
fee would likely survive judicial scrutiny under that test.121  On the other hand, if the 
fee was enacted by a limited home rule township,122 the court, applying Hamilton 
Township, must first determine whether the “fee” is really a “tax” by applying the 
“Withrow factors.”  It is highly unlikely that even a well-drafted impact fee 
resolution would avoid a fatal characterization as a tax.    
Even if a township’s impact fee avoided characterization as a tax, its survival 
would not be assured.  If the court accorded Beavercreek precedential effect on the 
issue of what standard should be applied to determine the constitutionality of a fee, 
and applied the dual rational nexus test, then any fee that had avoided 
characterization as a tax would likely, but not assuredly, survive.123  But a court 
might deny Beavercreek has precedential effect—perhaps using the reasoning I  
noted previously124—which would leave a court free to adopt a more stringent test 
than dual rational nexus; most likely the “specifically and uniquely attributable to the 
needs of the development” approach that Justice Pfeiffer favored in his Beavercreek 
dissent.125  Survival of an impact fee under that standard is far less likely.126   
                                                            
 120 An appellant’s attorney would be foolhardy to file a brief that failed to acknowledge and 
attempt to distinguish opposing authority.  Further, if the opposing authority is from the 
controlling jurisdiction—as Beavercreek almost assuredly was here—then the failure to 
disclose would violate Rule 3.3(a)(2) of both the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which state, in identical 
language: “(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly do any of the following: . . . (2) fail to disclose to 
the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel” (italics only in 
Ohio Rules). 
 121 Likely, but not assured.  Recall that, in Beavercreek, Justice Pfeiffer claimed that the 
impact fee at issue did not meet the second part of the majority’s dual rational nexus test 
because the city was not obligated to provide any of the credits potentially available. 
Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 
359 (Ohio 2000). 
 122 An attempt by a statutory township to enact an impact fee resolution would, if 
challenged, likely be declared ultra vires.  Such townships lacking both subdivision regulatory 
authority and limited home rule powers, may exercise only those powers which have been 
explicitly authorized by the legislature.  To date, this does not include the power to enact 
impact fees. 
 123 Taub, supra note 17. 
 124 See discussion supra text accompanying notes 116-118. 
 125 City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d at 359. 
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From the viewpoint of advocates for the use of impact fees, the practical effect of 
these differing standards is perverse: impact fees are defensible in municipalities, 
where the pace of new development, and thus the need for impact fees, is less, but 
effectively prohibited in townships where rapid development creates the most 
pressing need for impact fees.127  Obviously, those opposed to impact fees are likely 
to see it differently:  applauding the court’s barring their use precisely where they 
most likely would have been enacted.  
B.  What, if Anything, Should We do About it? 
The question of whether we should do anything about the current legal status of 
impact fees in Ohio depends, of course, on whether one believes impact fees are an 
efficient and equitable method to fund the provision of infrastructure and the capital 
costs of services that are necessitated by residential growth and the non-residential 
development that accompanies it.  Views on this question are emphatically mixed 
and the literature provides no definitive answers.128  
That said, the fact that twenty-eight states have adopted impact fee enabling 
legislation,129 including half the states neighboring Ohio,130 argues strongly that, at 
the least, it is time for the Ohio General Assembly to consider such legislation 
seriously.131  In 2004, the “Wolpert Report” had recommended that Ohio adopt 
                                                            
 126 See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 29, at 417, describing the “specifically and 
uniquely attributable to the needs of the development” test as “an almost insurmountable 
burden on local governments seeking money payments for extra development capital spending 
from developers whose activities necessitated such expenditures.”  See also, Rosenberg supra 
note 45, at 221-22, describing the “specifically and uniquely attributable to the needs of the 
development” test as “a highly restrictive view” that demands “a rigorous review of land use 
exactions and a near-linear cause and effect relationship between growth and public 
infrastructure.”  
 127 See discussion supra text accompanying note 71. 
 128 See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The 
Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 736-41 (2007) (discussing pros and 
cons of development exactions); Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 
CITYSCAPE 168 (2005) (extensively reviewing literature and concluding that “the existing 
literature has not yet established that impact fees raise the net cost of housing—the price after 
offsetting benefits, such as amenities or savings on alternative financing mechanisms, are 
accounted for”); Charles J. Delaney & Marc T. Smith, Development Exactions: Winners and 
Losers, 17 REAL EST. L.J. 219 (1989) (discussing economic burden of impact fees and 
concluding that burden “will be determined based on the pattern of supply and demand in a 
particular housing market”); Rosenberg, supra note 45, at 182 (“Not surprisingly, this 
emerging impact fee practice has been exceedingly popular with local governments and 
current residents, and it has dramatically accelerated over the last twenty years.  On the other 
hand, the practice has also been strongly criticized by landowners, developers, and affordable 
housing advocates as unfairly increasing the cost of new construction, imposing an unfair 
‘tax’ and raising housing prices.  Some have suggested that such fees actually constitute de 
facto growth controls with exclusionary implications.”).  See generally ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-
IBANEZ, supra note 21, at 6-7. 
 129 See jurisdictions supra note 8. 
 130 See jurisdictions supra note 8.  They are: Indiana, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. 
 131 Calls for legislative action to authorize impact fees were made in both Iowa and 
Mississippi after the Supreme Court of each state, as noted by Justice Pfeiffer in Hamilton 
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enabling legislation that would grant authority to townships and counties to adopt 
impact fees and to school districts to adopt impact fees for schools.132  A bill along 
those lines, H.B. 299, was introduced in the 126th General Assembly,133 but died with 
no further action taken in the Local Government Committee.134  No other impact fee 
enabling legislation has subsequently been introduced.135 
While H.B. 299 at least put the impact fee issue on the legislative agenda, 
however briefly, its provisions were fairly sparse in comparison to more 
comprehensive impact fee legislation, adopted elsewhere, which addresses the 
details of impact fees systems to a much greater extent.136  Accordingly, reviving 
H.B. 299, or something similar, would be far less preferable to proposing more 
comprehensive legislation that answers most, if not all of the questions this Article 
has noted.137  Moreover, even if there is no support for legislation that would extend 
authority to enact impact fees to townships—or to counties and school districts—
there is still need for enabling legislation for municipalities that would fill in the 
numerous gaps in the Beavercreek ruling.138  The time is long-past for Ohio to join 
the majority of states that have adopted enabling legislation for development impact 
fees. 
While any competently-drafted enabling legislation would be a step in the right 
direction, the legislature should adopt legislation that meets the following minimal 
                                                            
Township, ruled that a challenged impact fee was invalid.  See Kristin B. Flood, Note, Who 
Should Pay for the Impact of New Development in Iowa: Developers or the Preexisting 
Community? Analysis of Homebuilders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des 
Moines, 91 IOWA L. REV. 751 (2006) (analyzing court’s ruling and its effects and concluding 
that Iowa should adopt an impact fee enabling statute); Farmer, supra note 108 (analyzing 
court’s ruling and its effects and concluding that Mississippi should adopt an impact fee 
enabling statute); see also Patric O’Brien, Comment, The Bizarre Journey of Impact Fees in 
Massachusetts: From the “Foothills of Confusion” Around the “Mountains of Ignorance” 
and Up Into the “Castle in the Air”—Will “Rhyme and Reason” Ever be Rescued?, 35 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 511 (2001) (criticizing Massachusetts Appeals Court for ruling impact fee was 
invalid). 
 132 Report of the Subcommittee on Growth & Land Use, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
 133 H.B. 299, 126th Gen. Assembly (2005). 
 134 House Bill 299 Status Report of Legislation, 126th General Assembly, OHIO 
LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N (2005-2006), http://lsc.state.oh.us/coderev/hou126.nsf/ 
House+Bill+Number /0299?OpenDocument. 
 135 Find Bills, Resolutions, Analyses, Synopses & Fiscal Notes by Keyword, 129TH GEN. 
ASSEMBLY, STATE OF OHIO, http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/search.cfm#bill_keyword (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2012) (enter “impact fee” into the “Find Bills, Resolutions, Analyses, 
Synopses & Fiscal Notes by Keyword” box; then press the “Go” button).  
 136 See, e.g., Mulcahy & Zimet, supra note 63 (discussing provisions of Wisconsin 
enabling legislation); Leitner & Schoettle, supra note 27 (analyzing state impact fee 
legislation); Brian W. Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees: The “Second 
Generation,” 38 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 55 (1990) (same); see also Floyd B. Olson, Daniel J. 
Greensweig & Scott J. Riggs, The Future of Impact Fees in Minnesota, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 635 (1998) (proposing impact fee enabling legislation for Minnesota). 
 137 See discussion supra notes 59-67. 
 138 See discussion supra notes 59-67. 
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criteria.  Most critically, impact fee enabling legislation should authorize the 
imposition of fees by townships as well as municipalities.  The reason for this is 
clear: Since it is likely that a greater proportion of new development will continue to 
occur in townships rather than municipalities, legislation that fails to include 
townships simply perpetuates the current “perverse” situation in which  impact fees 
are banned where needed more and authorized where needed less.  Further, there is 
no reason to limit such an authorization to home rule townships, since the enabling 
legislation itself, rather than a township’s home rule or police powers, supports the 
imposition of the impact fee.  In addition, impact fee legislation should authorize 
fees for at least the most common forms of infrastructure improvements:  water, 
sewer, storm-water, parks, and roads. The legislature should also consider including 
authorization for fire, police, and library services. While H.B. 299 authorized impact 
fees for schools, I am not advocating that schools be included in the enabling 
legislation.  Funding for schools has been an extraordinarily contentious issue in 
Ohio for over two decades, and remains unresolved.139  Including schools in impact 
fee enabling legislation would likely serve only to inject a divisive issue into the 
impact fee debate.   
Finally, the legislation should answer many, if not all, of the more technical 
issues relating to calculation, imposition, collection, and administration in an impact 
fee system.  These include:  (1) what future landuse and capital facilities plans 
should be required before a jurisdiction can enact an impact fee; (2) whether non-
residential development may lawfully be charged fees for facilities—such as parks 
and libraries—the demand for which is only tenuously connected to non-residential 
development; (3) when should an impact fee be assessed (or the amount calculated) 
and when should it be collected; (4) how frequently must an impact fee be re-
calculated; (5) what percentage, if any, of the impact fees may be spent on 
administration of the impact fee system; (6) how long may an impact fee paid for an 
individual development be retained before it must be expended and what are the 
rebate procedures if it is not expended within that time-frame; (7) to what extent 
should a developer’s proportionate share of project costs be reduced to reflect such 
items as the developer’s previous or future monetary or in-kind contributions (e.g., 
land dedication or construction of infrastructure) and monetary payments for the 
infrastructure or services at issue provided by the enacting jurisdiction and/or other 
levels of government; and (8) should there be exemptions from the fee for low and 
moderate income housing, or other developments deemed to be socially desirable, 
and, if so, how will the jurisdiction make-up the shortfall.140 
                                                            
 139 In 1991, a lawsuit was filed that led to a 1997 ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court that the 
state’s system for funding education was unconstitutional, followed by five years of court 
oversight of legislative efforts to enact a school funding system that could pass constitutional 
scrutiny, which ultimately failed.  See DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 
1997), modified by DeRolph v. State, 678 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1997), DeRolph v. State, 699 
N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1998), and DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000), 
DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001), vacated by DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 
529 (Ohio 2002) (affirming DeRolph I and DeRolph II).  See generally Larry J. Obhof, 
DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate Education, 2005 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. 
J. 83 (2005) (analyzing entire course of the DeRolph litigation and legislative responses and 
concluding that significant progress has been made since the courts first heard the DeRolph 
case, but funding concerns remain). 
 140 See discussion and sources supra notes 59-70.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Drees Company v. Hamilton 
Township,141 invalidating the development impact fees adopted by a limited home 
rule township, is a deeply distressing decision.  In Hamilton Township, the Court, 
rather than engaging in a fair-handed analysis, chose instead to rely on very limited 
authority to support a conclusion that appears to have been pre-determined.  In 
particular, the court failed even to acknowledge, let alone distinguish: (1) its own 
ruling upholding impact fees twelve years before in Homebuilders Association of 
Dayton and the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek,142 and (2) the state supreme 
court decisions that had rejected the reasoning of the Iowa and Mississippi courts 
upon which the Court relied in part.  The Court’s Hamilton Township ruling leaves 
Ohio with a bifurcated approach to impact fees that is perverse because impact fees 
are defensible in municipalities, where the pace of new development, and thus the 
need for impact fees, is less, but effectively prohibited in townships where rapid 
development creates the most pressing need for impact fees.  Given the court’s 
conflicting rulings, the time is long-past for the legislature to examine the policy 
debate on impact fees and make a decision about adopting enabling legislation for 
impact fees.  That decision should be to join the majority of states that have enacted 
such legislation. 
 
  
                                                            
 141 Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp., 970 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 2012). 
 142 Homebuilders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 
349 (Ohio 2000). 
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